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POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER STRIKING 
APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS DATED OCTOBER 
31, 1986, WERE IN FACT INTERLOCUTORY 
IN CHARACTER. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
...a summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone, although 
there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. (Emphasis added.) 
Consistent with Rule 56(c), this court, on its own motion 
for lack of finality, dismissed appellant's appeal from denial of 
his motion for summary judgment dated December 31, 1986. 
(Addendum, Case No. 870045.) 
Therefore, this appeal should be included within the 
very last appeal which has been filed in this court's Case No. 
870342 from the final act, judgments, and orders of the lower court. 
Also, this appeal should be consolidated with all appeals 
being transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FILE FINDINGS 
OF FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER STRIKING APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS 
DATED OCTOBER 31, 1986. 
Although Respondent AMICA stated in argument by Mr. 
Morgan that AMICA was not asking in its motion for summary 
judgment on its complaint (T. 108, August 19, 1986.), the lower 
court merely granted summary judgments without any other designation 
and struck appellant's affidavits without any stated reasons and 
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without any findings of facts in either matter. 
AMICA filed its motion for summary judgment as to 
appellant's counterclaim only. (T. Ill, August 19, 1986.) 
Although the lower court's Memorandum Decision dated 
September 30, 1986, granted Respondent AMICA's motion for summary 
judgment dismissing appellant Schettler's counterclaim, the lower 
court's Summary Judgment and Order merely granted summary judgments 
in favor of all respondents and struck appellant's affidavits 
and expressly stated: 
The Motion of AMICA Mutual Insurance 
Company to Strike Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff's Pleadings as sanctions 
is reserved for ruling at a later time. 
(Emphasis added.) (Addendum, October 
31, 1986, Civil No. C85-2687.) 
Schettler's "Pleadings" included his counterclaim, i.e., 
all pleadings. Confusion is present because of the documents 
mentioned above. 
Therefore, without findings of facts or further explan-
ation as to what was intended by the lower court's October 31, 
1986, decision, this matter should be remanded to the lower court 
with instructions to file findings of facts. With such remand, 
the interlocutory summary judgment and the striking of appellant's 
affidavits should become a part of the final appeal which has been 
filed in this court's Case No. 870342. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROVIDED NO EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING BEFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER STRIKING APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS 
DATED OCTOBER 31, 1986. 
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Mr. Flint for Appellant Schettler anticipated an eviden-
tiary hearing would be needed ultimately relative to both motions, 
i.e., for summary judgment and to strike pleadings. (T. 154, 
Ins. 22-24, August 19, 1986.) 
Mr. Heath for Respondent AMICA, relative to its motion 
to strike the pleadings, contended that an evidentiary hearing 
would not be necessary. (T. 157, Ins. 17, 18.) 
Interestingly, Mr. Morgan for Respondent AMICA, relative 
to its motion for summary judgment, made no mention of any eviden-
tiary hearing. 
It is well settled that refusal of an evidentiary hearing 
relative to striking an answer and rendering a default judgment 
against the defendant because he is in civil contempt is an 
unconstitutional denial of due process. (Duell v. Duell, 178 
F.2d 683; Hammond Packing v. State of Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322; 
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409.) 
Also, see: Dorsey v. Academy Moving and Storage, Inc., 
423 F.2d 858; Societe International v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, citing 
Cf. Tol v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, together with Hammond and 
Hovey, supra.) 
The same rationale should apply to granting summary 
judgments without a hearing. 
In Societe, supra, at 213, the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
But these problems go to the adequacy 
of petitioner's proof and should not 
on the record preclude petitioner from 
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being able to contest on the merits. 
...dismissal of the complaint with 
prejudice was not justified. 
Summary judgment prevents the appellant from having 
his day in court to be heard afforded him by due process. 
Without findings, there is no way this court can deter-
mine whether or not the summary judgments and striking appellant's 
affidavits were for sanctions or for undisputed facts. 
Therefore, this appeal should be remanded to the lower 
court with instructions to file findings of facts. With such 
remand, the interlocutory summary judgments and striking appellant's 
affidavits will become a part of the final appeal which has been 
filed in this court's Case No. 870342. 
POINT IV 
DISPUTED FACTS EXISTED TO PREVENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED OCTOBER 31, 
1986. 
Without findings of facts being filed by the lower 
court, there are no reasons stated for his granting AMIGA'S motion 
for summary judgment. 
If summary judgment was granted because of no disputed 
facts existed because appellant's affidavits were stricken, then 
we must look to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
states: 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to 
the day of hearing may serve opposing 
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affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. (Emphasis added.) 
Aside for a moment, if summary judgment was in fact 
granted because of sanctions, it should be noted that an order 
punishing for civil contempt is interlocutory and reviewable upon 
appeal taken for subsequent final judgment. (Due11, supra, at 
687, 688 [8] and cases cited therein. Also, see Contempt, Key 
66(2), 72.) 
This is another reason for the need of remand for 
findings, because in either case, i.e., summary judgment because 
of sanctions or undisputed facts, the summary judgments and the 
striking of appellant's affidavits were interlocutory and to be 
part of the final judgment appeal. 
This was, in effect, the holding of this court in this 
very appeal, this court's Case No. 860621, wherein the court 
stated: 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
is denied without prejudice to the 
issues raised therein being addressed 
in the following appeal from the 
final judgment. (Addendum, Dated 
August 11, 1987.) 
By implication, the same should be afforded Mr. Schettler, 
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It is recognized, as stated in AMICA's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the 
lower court: 
It is well established in this 
jurisdiction that summary judgment 
may be granted only if it is shown 
that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law under those facts. 
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 
292, 431 P.2d 127 (1967). In con-
sidering a motion for summary 
judgment, a court is under a duty to 
view all of the evidence, admissions, 
and inferences most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. Bihlaier 
v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1970). 
Finally, a court considering a motion 
for summary judgment must not engage 
in a weighing of the evidence or in 
judging of the credibility of the 
witnesses or affiants in determining 
whether there is a reasonable prob-
ability that the party moved against 
could, in fact, prevail at trial. 
Sandberg v. Klein, 576. P.2d 1291 
(Utah 1978). 
Also, see Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
60 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, P. 2d , decided June 25, 1987; 
and Anderson et al v. Libberty Lobby, Inc. , et al. , 46 CCH S.Ct. 
Bull. P., B3503, Supreme Court of the United States, decided 
June 25, 1986. 
Although the lower court made no findings relative to 
undisputed material facts, the record is saturated with alleged 
disputed facts. Only one on each claim is required for denial 
of summary judgment. 
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AMICA admits in its Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. 
Schettler's Motion for Summary Judgment that there is at least 
one material fact in dispute, i.e., whether the taking of Mr. 
Schettler's vehicle was a fltheft,f or an authorized repossession. 
Theft 
AMICA claims that there was no theft but that the vehicle 
was repossessed by Pioneer Dodge. (Record at 715-7 and 1174.) 
Mr. Schettler contends that there was a theft. (Record 
at 715-75.) Also, see Mr. Schoenfeld's deposition p. 75, Ins. 
2-16, where he testified that he did not notify the police of his 
intent to repossess the vehicle, nor did he notify the police 
after taking the vehicle, contrary to standard industry practice. 
Mr. Schoenfeld stated therein: 
Carl stoled (sic) it from me and I 
stoled (sic) it back and I wanted 
to pretend it never left. 
See, also, Schoenfeld's deposition, p. 76, Ins. 6 through 
p. 77, In. 16; p. 78, Ins. 16 through p. 78, In. 19, where he 
testified that he hid the vehicle in either one of the garages at 
Pioneer Dodge or someplace off the lot so that Mr. Schettler 
could not come and take the car back again. He testified he hid 
the car for the purpose of pretending that the vehicle had never 
left the lot so that he could attempt to secure a mechanic's lien 
A wrongful taking or disappearance of a vehicle is 
tantamount to theft under the law and under the policy of insurance. 
(Clark Equipment Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 
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608 P.2d 903 (Kansas 1980).) 
A policy covering theft or larceny covers a wrongful 
taking of an automobile regardless of whether the taking is 
accomplished through trespass or fraud. (Mann v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 698 P.2d 925 (Oklahoma 1985).) 
Furthermore, this court has held that the meaning of 
theft within an insurance policy in Utah should be liberally 
construed to mean the taking without authority of the property of 
another. (P.E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 165; 406 
P.2d 306, 308 (1965).) See, also, Kilpatrick v. Motors Insurance 
Corp., 561 P.2d 472 (New Mexico 1977).) 
Also, AMICA admits that "theft not required for coverage 
in our policy.11 (Deposition of Ronald Rosenthal, p. 45, Ins. 12 
through p. 51, In. 4.) 
The taking of the vehicle under any of the admitted 
circumstances was without good faith on the part of Mr. Schoenfeld 
and constituted theft. 
The disputed facts relative to theft are of the most 
significance because AMICA1s complaint is for fraud, alleging Mr. 
Schettler!s vehicle was not stolen. All causes of action are 
premises on theft or no theft. 
Statement of Disputed Facts 
Allegation : Factual Dispute 
1. No influence or attempts : 1. Deposition of Rosenthal, 
to influence investigation of : exhibits: 
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Allegation #1 cont'd. 
Sheriff's office. 
Affidavit of Detective 
Mortenson states that no one 
tried to influence or pressure 
him in the criminal investiga-
tion of Schettler. 
Schettler disputes. 
Factual Dispute #1, cont'd. 
#52, dated March 14, 1983, Black 
is working with the Salt Lake 
City detectives, district attorney 
and with the NATB representative. 
"Hopefully all this will result 
in the return of our payment." 
Signed by Rosenthal 
#53, dated March 24, 1983, Black 
states he and Detective Mortenson 
have decided Schettler knew the 
car was at Pioneer when reported 
stolen and also states that Carl 
Schettler's auto dealer license 
would be revoked. 
#57, dated August 19, 1983, Black 
indicates he has contacted NATB's 
Ellery Summer, and Detective 
Mortenson of Sheriff's office 
who told Black that he, Mortenson, 
"felt there was a very little 
chance to get a conviction on 
Schettler, but after further 
conference with him he has agreed 
to go on and review additional 
Factual Dispute #1 cont'd, 
information we obtained from 
Schoenfeld. He will then present 
it to the Salt Lake County 
Prosecutor." 
#58, dated October 12, 1982, 
Guiver admits to meeting with 
Mortenson and Deputy County 
Attorney Neal Gunnarson and urgin 
prosecution, and states that 
Gunnarson would prosecute (con-
trary to what Gunnarson says in 
his deposition at page 10). 
#64, dated March 5, 1984, Guiver 
states he is calling the Sheriff1 
office twice a week urging them 
"to get this claim off dead cente 
#65, dated March 26, 1984, Rosen-
thal asks Guiver to get the local 
NATB representative to "assist 
you in getting the County Attorney 
Office moving on this case. 
#66, dated April 2, 1984, Guiver 
states that if Detective Mortensot 
does not get his action filed 
Factual Dispute #1, cont'd, 
against Schettler by April 5, 
1984, that "we will go directly 
to the County Attorney's Office 
and see what we can do." 
#67, dated April 30, 1984, 
Guiver says that Ellery Summer's 
of NATB has also "been after 
Mr. Mortenson, but with the same 
results as we have had," and 
states that he and Summer's will 
contact "the Sgt. in charge of 
auto theft and see if something 
can be worked out." 
#68, dated June 8, 1984, Guiver 
states, "We have finally been 
able to get this matter off dead 
center. I met this morning with 
Detective Mortenson and Attorney 
Ernie Jones of Criminal Division, 
Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office. Mr. Jones agreed to issue 
a warrent (sic) for the arrest 
of Schettler. 
Allegation 
2. No influence of attempts 
to influence the role of the 
prosecutors. 
Affidavits of Ernest 
Jones and Neal Gunnarson state 
that criminal proceedings 
against Schettler were made 
solely by the County 
Attorney's Office. 
Schettler disputes. 
Factual Dispute 
2. See previous discussion and 
contents of exhibits 52, 57, 58, 
65, 66, 68 of Deposition of 
Ronald Rosenthal. See also, 
Deposition of Neal Gunnarson: 
p. 10, states that he referred 
the Schettler criminal investiga-
tion back to the Sheriff's Office 
for further investigation and did 
not agree to file charges (contra 
Guiver's letter of October 12, 
1982.) 
pp. 12-14, states that the police 
officer who brings a case to him 
for screening comes alone to 
present the case and brings 
statements from witnesses; that 
less than five percent of screen-
ings have any complaining wit-
nesses present and it is very rare 
p. 19, states does not recall if 
he declined case or not. 
pp. 30-31, states does not know 
who keeps declination forms or 
where filed. 
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Factual Dispute #2, cont'd. 
Deposition of Ernest Jones: 
pp. 13-14, states that Guiver 
was at the screening, and contrary 
to what Gunnarson stated, that it 
would not be unusual for witnesses 
to attend screening. 
pp. 26-28, states that the 
criminal case against Schettler 
was based on the fact that 
Schettler never told his insurer, 
AMICA, that the car was at 
Pioneer Dodge. 
p. 29, indicates that Schettler 
should be prosecuted because he 
failed to pay Pioneer Dodge for 
repair work. 
Deposition of LaMar Guiver and 
Exhibit 2; admits attending 
screenings. 
p. 33, states that Guiver and the 
insurance company "were more than 
willing to provide us with any 
documents that we needed as part 
of the insurance fraud case.11 
Allegation #2, cont'd. Factual Dispute #2, cont'd, 
p. 34, admits that counsel for 
plaintiff drew up his affidavit 
and he signed it after having 
been subpoeaned to testify by 
Schettler's counsel, but before 
testifying. 
The above disputed facts are but some of many. However, 
for emphasis, permit us to be redundant: (1) only one disputed 
material fact is sufficient to deny granting summary judgment; 
and (2) summary judgments are interlocutory in character. 
Therefore, this court should reverse and remand with 
instructions for filing findings of facts and having the inter-
locutory summary judgments and the striking of Mr. Schettler's 
affidavits included in the last appeal filed after final judgment 
of the lower court. (This court's Case No. 870342.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court's Memorandum Decision dated September 
30, 1986, disclosed the lower court's intent at that time was to 
dismiss appellant's counterclaim. However, within the last para-
graph of that Memorandum Decision, the lower court stated: 
Counsel for the prevailing parties 
are to prepare the appropriate Orders 
in accordance with the Local Rules 
of Practice. (Emphasis added.) 
The Order, dated October 31, 1986, (Case No. C-85-2687, 
Addendum) which was prepared by Respondent AMICA's counsel, stated: 
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The Motion of AMICA Mutual Insurance 
Company to Strike Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff's Pleadings as 
Sanctions is hereby reserved for 
ruling at a later time. 
The Summary Judgment, dated October 31, 1986 (Case No. 
C-85-2687, Addendum) involved all respondents, but as it relates 
to Respondent AMICA, it was prepared by Respondent AMICA1s counsel 
and stated: 
It Is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and 
Decreed that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of plaintiff and third-party 
defendant AMICA Mutual Insurance 
Company is hereby granted. 
For reasons unknown to present counsel, because Mr. 
Flint was then counsel for appellant relative to that matter, the 
Summary Judgment itself merely granted summary judgment, without 
any mention of appellant's counterclaim. 
It is assumed without accusation that within the approx-
imate one month's time between the Memorandum Decision and the 
formal Summary Judgment, Messrs. Morgan and Flint discussed and 
agreed upon the wording of the formal Summary Judgment. 
Appellant argues that the wording of an instrument 
should be interpreted strictly as written by its author. 
It would seem that there should be an explainable reason 
why the counterclaim was not included within the formal Summary 
Judgment dated October 31, 1986. 
Findings of facts would be of considerable assistance 
in dispelling the present confusion. 
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Finally, an evidentiary hearing, and not merely 
arguments and memoranda, should have been afforded before any 
findings of facts could be made. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment because of sanctions requires a hearing 
and is interlocutory in character. 
Summary judgment may not be granted if there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact. 
Rule 56(c) provides that affidavits may be filed. They 
are not mandatory. The contended disputed facts may be determined 
from depositions, etc., or at an evidentiary hearing. There were 
depositions in this matter, but there was no evidentiary hearing. 
As stated in this court's ruling of August 11, 1987, 
issues raised in this appeal may be included in the following 
appeal from final judgment in the entire case. 
Therefore, the lower court's granting of summary 
judgments and the striking of Mr. Schettler's affidavits should 
be reversed and remanded to the lower court with instructions of 
inclusion within the final judgment of the lower court. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is hereby requested under Category No. 
13(b). 
Respectfully submitted this J!Xf^^<tey of November, 
1987. 
-16-
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
April 16, 1987 
OFFCCE OF THE CLERK 
Phil L. Hansen 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Arnica Mutual Insurance 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
u. No. 870045 
Carl F. Schettler, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
nnt i nm) 
THIS DAY, the aboue case is dismissed on the Court's ouin 
motion for lack of finality. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant and Third 
Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA 
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS, 
& GUIVER, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-85-2687 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Arnicafs Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the 
defendant's Counterclaim is granted. 
2. National Automobile Theft Bureaufs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
3. The Motion of James M. Black, Barbara Black and R. LaMar 
Guiver for Summary Judgment is granted. 
4. Arnica1 s Motion to Strike Affidavit in Opposition to 
its Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
5. The Court reserves ruling on plaintifffs Motion for 
Sanction and Striking Defendants Pleadings. 
AMICA V. SCHETTLER PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Counsel for the prevailing parties are to prepare the appro-
priate Orders in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice. 
Dated this c\*?cJ day of September, 1986. 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
AMICA V. SCHETTLER PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of September, 1986; 
Henry E. Heath 
S. Baird Morgan 
Mark J, Taylor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward Flint 
Attorney for Defendant Carl F. Schettler 
3105 Plateau Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phil L. Hansen 
Co-counsel for Carl F. Schettler 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert R. Wallace 
Attorney for Defendants Black, Nichols & Guiver 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wesley M. Lang 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
National Automobile Theft Bureau 
136 S. Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
HENRY E. HEATH, 1441 
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J-. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, ] 
Defendant. ] 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, j 
Third-Party ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V S • j 
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA ] 
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS & ) 
CUIVER, and R. LaMAR GUIVER, ) 
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE ) 
THEFT BUREAU, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendants. ) 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) AND ORDER 
> Civil No. C85-2687 
I Judge Richard Moffat 
WHEREAS, on August 19, 1986, before the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, District Court Judge of the above-entitled court, the 
following motions having corae for hearing: 
1. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for 
NOV 3 1986 
H. Dixon Hindle^pierk^ro Ojst. Court 
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Summary Judgment; 
2. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to 
Strike Pleadings; 
3. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to 
Strike Affidavits in Opposition; 
4. Third-party defendant National Automobile Theft 
Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
5. Third-party defendants James Black, Barbara Black, 
dba Black, Nichols & Guiver's and R. LaMar Guiver's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
AND WHEREAS, the following parties and counsel being 
present: 
1. Henry E. Heath, S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. Taylor, 
attorneys for plaintiff and third-party defendant AMICA Mutual 
Insurance Company; 
2. Robert Wallace, attorney for James Black, Barbara 
Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver, and R. LaMar Guiver, third-
party defendants. 
3. Jay Jensen and Wesley Lang attorneys for National 
Automobile Theft Bureau, third-party defendant; 
4. Phil Hansen and Ed Flint attorneys and Carl Schettler 
personally, for and on behalf of defendant and third-party plain-
tiff Carl F. Schettler. 
AND WHEREAS, the court having heard argument from counsel 
with regard to the above-described motions and having reviewed the 
memoranda, affidavits, depositions and other pleadings of record; 
A3 -2-
AND WHEREAS, the defendant and third-party plaintiff, by 
and through counsel of record having stipulated in open court that 
the cause of action based on conversion be dismissed and also that 
all third-party claims against third-party defendant Barbara Black 
be dismissed and this court having previously so ordered; 
AND WHEREAS, the court expressly finding, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no 
just reason for delay and that the dismissal of all claims of the 
counterclaim of defendant and third-party plaintiff shall be a 
final judgment; 
AND WHEREAS, the court having provided additional time to 
defendant and third-party plaintiff to file additional points and 
authorities and affidavits in opposition to said motions and none 
having been filed, and the court being otherwise fully advised in 
the premises now enters its judgment and order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff and third-party defendant 
AMICA Mutual Insurance Company is hereby granted. The Motion for 
Summary Judgment of third-party defendant National Automobile 
Theft Bureau is hereby granted. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
of James Black, Barbara Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver and R. 
LaMar Guiver is hereby granted. AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's 
Motion to Strike Affidavits of Elizabeth B. Stewart, Reid W. 
Gorritscn, Debra Ann Murdock, Lisa Hewiston, Lowell V. Summerhays, 
Fredrick W. Green and Jim Hanson in opposition to its Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The Motion of AMICA Mutual 
A i 
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Insurance Company to Strike Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff's 
Pleadings as Sanctions is hereby reserved for ruling at a later 
DATED this 3 / ^ day o f / ^ ^ f e ^ 1986. 
BY ATTEST 
DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
Lteputy Clerk 
Judge 
CgSTiriCATB OF HAND-DELIVERY 
1 KCKEBY CXXtVTt that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Scisswry Judgment and Order was hand-delivered this cD^" day of 
Octob-or, 1986, to the following: 
Phil Hansen 
Attorneys for Carl F. Schettler 
*800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert Wallace 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wesley Lang 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
-900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RULE 56 Utah Rules of 
No judgment by default shall be entered against 
the State of Utah or against an officer or agency 
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or 
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For CSaiauat. 
<») For Defeadiag Party. 
(c) MoUoo sad Proceedings Tkereoa. 
<d) Case Mot Fatty Adjadftcsle** oo Motioa. 
<«> Fom of Affidavit* Fartacr Tettiaway; Deftast 
ReqoJred. 
<f) Waea Affidavits arc Uuvailafcie. 
(g) Affidavits Made la Bad Faith. 
(a) For Claimant. 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counte-
rclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
twenty days from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment 
by the adverse party, move with or without suppo-
rting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
<•) For Defending Party. 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motioa and Proceedings Thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppo-
sing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rend-
ered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there b a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjadicated on Motioa. 
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material 
facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith contr-
overted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controv-
ersy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as 
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Farther Testimony; Defense 
Repaired. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served the-
rewith. The court may permit affidavits to be *up-
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plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and suppo-
rted as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as oth-
erwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not %o respond, summary judgment, d 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. 
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidavits presented purs-
uant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, 
including reasonable attorney*s fees, and any offe-
nding party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
?ivil Procedure 
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August 11, 1987 OFFICE OF THE CLIRK 
Phil L Hansen, Esq. 
Hansen & Hansen 
800 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Arru c.a Mutual Insurance, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
u 
Carl F. Schettler, 
Defendant and Appellant^ 
Carl F. Schettler, 
Third -Party Pla int. if f 
and Appel1 ant , 
u. No. 86062 1 
James M Black and Barbara J Black 
dba Black, Nichols & Guiuer; R. LaMar 
Guiuer; and National Automobile Theft 
Bureau, 
Thj rd-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Respondent's motion to Dismif. s Appeal is denied without prejudice to 
the issues raised therein being addressed in the follouiing appeal 
from the final judgment. Counsel for the appellant is required to 
personally pay to counsel for for the respondent the sum of $200.00 
as and for attorney fees. 
Geoffrey J Butler, Clerk 
